DeWitt v. Penn Del Directory by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-14-1997 
DeWitt v. Penn Del Directory 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"DeWitt v. Penn Del Directory" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 39. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/39 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
 1 
     
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
  
 No. 96-7163  
 ___________ 
 
 CAROL DEWITT, 
   Appellant 
 
  v. 
 
PENN-DEL DIRECTORY CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; NATIONAL 
TELEPHONE DIRECTORY CORPORATION PROFIT SHARING PLAN; 
NATIONAL TELEPHONE DIRECTOR CORPORATION PLAN 
ADMINISTRATOR OF PROFIT SHARING PLAN 
 ___________ 
  
 Appeal from the United States District Court  
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 93-cv-00581) 
 ___________ 
   
 Argued 
 December 12, 1996 
 Before:  BECKER, MANSMANN and LEWIS, Circuit Judges. 
 ___________  
 
 (Filed February 14, 1997) 
 ___________ 
 
John M. Stull, Esquire (ARGUED) 
Suite 710 
1220 North Market Street 
P.O. Box 1947 
Wilmington, DE  19899 
 
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
 
Francis M. Milone, Esquire (ARGUED) 
Lynn A. Collins, Esquire 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 
2000 One Logan Square 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
  
 
 2 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 Carol Dewitt appeals from the entry of summary judgment 
against her in her action to recover benefits and for unlawful 
termination intended to preclude attainment of her rights under 
her profit sharing plan pursuant to sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 510 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1132(a)(1)(B).  Dewitt sought benefits allegedly due her as a 
participant of the National Telephone Directory Profit Sharing 
Plan for the 1990 plan year.   
 We are asked to decide whether the Plan Administrator 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying additional accrued 
benefits to Dewitt's account balance for the 1990 Plan year by 
distributing Dewitt's benefits on an expedited basis, contrary to 
the Plan's provisions.  Because we believe that the Plan 
Administrator's interpretation of the Plan and expedited 
distribution of benefits controverts the plain language of the 
Plan, we conclude that the Administrator acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously.  Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
 Dewitt also alleges that her employer terminated her on 
pretextual grounds with the specific intent to deny her status as 
a Plan participant as of the Valuation Date at the end of 
December 1990.  Because we agree with the district court that 
Dewitt has not provided sufficient evidence of specific intent to 
interfere with her benefits, we will affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer on Dewitt's 
section 510 claim.   
  
 
 3 
  
 I. 
 During the ten years that Carol Dewitt was an employee 
of Penn-Del Directory Corporation, she was a participant in the 
National Telephone Directory Corporation Profit Sharing Plan, an 
employee pension plan governed by ERISA and administered by the 
National Telephone Directory Corporation, a New Jersey 
corporation and sister corporation to Penn-Del.  At the time of 
her termination, Dewitt was 100% vested in her account under the 
Plan. 
 Pursuant to the Plan, "Employer Contributions" and 
"Plan Forfeitures" are credited to the account of Plan 
participants on a date referred to as the Valuation Date, defined 
as the last business day of each December.  Plan ¶¶ 5.01, 5.02, 
6.02(c)-(d).  The Plan requires, as a condition to receipt of 
these benefits, that the Plan participant be employed as of the 
Valuation Date.  Plan ¶¶ 5.01, 5.02.  In addition, the Plan 
provides that each participant's account will be credited with 
"Trust Income", i.e., the net increase or decrease in the fair 
market value of trust assets as measured from the last Valuation 
Date.  Plan ¶ 6.02(e).  Unlike the situation with Employer 
Contributions and Plan Forfeitures, the receipt of Trust Income 
is not conditioned upon the participant's employment on the 
Valuation Date.  In order to receive Trust Income, however, a 
Plan participant must have a viable Plan account on the Valuation 
Date.  Plan ¶ 6.02(3). 
  
 
 4 
 On December 12, 1990, Dewitt was terminated from her 
position as a sales representative, allegedly for mishandling an 
account.  At a meeting to discuss her termination, Penn-Del 
Division Manager Victor Raad reviewed with Dewitt the incident 
that precipitated her termination.  Pension benefits were also 
discussed.  Although there is some dispute between Dewitt and 
Raad regarding precisely what was said at this meeting on the 
topic of Dewitt's benefits, both parties agree that Raad told 
Dewitt that it takes approximately 30 to 90 days before Dewitt 
would actually receive the distribution of the balance of her 
Plan account.  Affidavit of Victor Raad, Exhibit C at ¶9.  Dewitt 
asserts that this statement led her to believe that her 
distribution check would not be processed until a date well 
beyond the Valuation Date.  Dewitt also maintains that Raad told 
her that her account would include Employer Contributions, Plan 
Forfeitures and Trust Income through the end of the 1990 Plan 
year.  To the contrary, in his affidavit, Raad states that no 
discussion occurred regarding the nature of the benefits which 
would be included in Dewitt's check.  Ex. C at ¶8. 
 On December 14, 1990, Dewitt filled out a request for 
distribution of her account balance.  A check was issued two 
weeks later, on December 28, 1990, for Dewitt's total account 
balance in the amount of $75,520.88.  Believing this figure to be 
inaccurate because it did not contain any amounts representing 
Employer Contributions, Plan Forfeitures or Trust Income, Dewitt 
contacted Raad to discuss the amount.  After her conversation 
with Raad, Dewitt pursued an appeal pursuant to the 
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administrative process established by the Plan.  Following the 
denial of her appeal, Dewitt filed this action.  
 In her complaint, Dewitt asserted claims against her 
former employer (Penn-Del), the Plan (National Telephone 
Directory Corporation Profit Sharing Plan) and the Plan's 
Administrator (National Telephone Directory Corp.) under ERISA 
for recovery of benefits and for unlawful termination intended to 
preclude attainment of her rights under the Plan.  In Count I of 
her complaint, Dewitt asserts that she had a right under the Plan 
to receive the 1990 Plan year Employer Contributions, Plan 
Forfeitures, and Trust Income allocable to her account.  In this 
Count, Dewitt alleges that defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B), ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).  This section of ERISA 
permits a plan participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action 
"to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan."  In 
support of her section 502(a)(1)(B) claim, Dewitt asserts that 
the defendants "arbitrarily and capriciously denied additional 
accrued benefits to [her] account balance in the Plan for the 
plan year 1990 by having her benefits paid on an expedited basis 
by the Plan Administrator, contrary to Plan provisions."  
Complaint ¶16, A. 64.  Second, she asserts that "her account was 
treated arbitrarily as indicated by the method used in another 
former employee's Plan account payment. . . ."  Id.  Another 
terminated employee, Stephen Byrne, received Employer 
Contributions, Plan Forfeitures and Trust Income even though he 
was not technically employed at the end of the Plan year.  Dewitt 
asserted that Penn-Del terminated Byrne on December 14, 1988, but 
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that the Plan recorded Byrne's termination date as January 3, 
1989, thereby qualifying Byrne for his share of the previous 
year's Employer Contributions and Plan Forfeitures.   Complaint 
¶16; Affidavit of Steven Byrne, A. 7. 
 In Count II of her Complaint, Dewitt asserts that Penn-
Del discharged her to prevent her from qualifying for the 1990 
Employer Contributions, Plan Forfeitures and Trust Income 
allocable to her account.  In this Count, she asserts that her 
termination violated 29 U.S.C. § 1140, ERISA § 510, which makes 
it "unlawful to discharge . . . a participant . . . for the 
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which 
such participant may become entitled under the Plan." 
 On December 22, 1994, in ruling on the defendants' 
joint motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed Dewitt's 
section 502(a)(1)(B) claim for Employer Contributions and Plan 
Forfeitures, benefits which formed the bulk of her prayer for 
relief, because the terms of Dewitt's Plan expressly required 
that she be employed on December 31, 1990 in order to be eligible 
to receive those benefits, and she was not.1  Dewitt v. Penn-Del 
Directory Corporation, 872 F. Supp. 126 (D. Del. 1994) (Dewitt 
I). 
                     
1.   The court also dismissed DeWitt's section 510 claims 
for interference with these same benefits as barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations.   
 
 The court, however, declined to dismiss DeWitt's claims 
for 1990 Trust Income pursuant to both section 502(a)(1)(B) and 
510 because it concluded that DeWitt's complaint stated those 
claims.  See 872 F. Supp. at 136.  
  
 The court also denied a motion for summary judgment 
filed by DeWitt. 
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 On July 31, 1995, Dewitt moved for summary judgment on 
those claims which survived dismissal in Dewitt I.  As a result 
of the district court's holdings in Dewitt I, only Dewitt's 
claims for Trust Income pursuant to ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 
510, an amount between $1,400 and $2,200, were deemed viable by 
the court.  See 912 F. Supp. at 711.  The defendants filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that Dewitt was not 
entitled to Trust Income under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because the 
administration of the Plan was not arbitrary and capricious, and 
that Dewitt was not entitled to Trust Income pursuant to ERISA § 
510 because she had not met her burden of proving that Penn-Del 
had specific intent to interfere with her benefits.   
 The district court held a hearing on these motions2 on 
October 22, 1995.  By order dated January 17, 1996, the district 
court denied Dewitt's motion for summary judgment for Trust 
Income based both upon the terms of the Plan and upon a breach of 
fiduciary duty theory.  Instead, the court granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment for Trust Income pursuant 
to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), based upon the reasonableness of the 
Plan Administrator's interpretation of the Plan and the district 
court's deferential standard of review of the Plan 
Administrator's actions.  The court also granted Penn-Del's 
motion for summary judgment for Trust Income pursuant to section 
                     
2.   In addition to the cross-motions for summary judgment, 
DeWitt also filed a motion to compel discovery responses from the 
defendants.  Defendants moved to strike DeWitt's motion to compel 
discovery responses.  The court denied DeWitt's motion to compel 
discovery and instead granted the defendants' motion to strike.   
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 510 of ERISA, 28 U.S.C. § 1140.  The district court found that 
the facts as alleged by Dewitt were not sufficient to provide 
circumstantial evidence of specific intent.3  On January 29, 
1996, Dewitt filed a Motion for Clarification and Reargument of 
                     
3.   DeWitt also sought summary judgment with respect to her 
request for Employer Contributions and Plan Forfeitures on the 
ground that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by 
making misleading statements to her.  The district court had 
previously found that DeWitt was not entitled to Employer 
Contributions and Plan Forfeitures in DeWitt I, 872 F. Supp. at 
130, based upon the court's findings that the Plan required, as a 
condition to receipt of those benefits, employment as of the 
Valuation Date.  The court observed that in attempting to renew 
her request for these benefits, DeWitt had changed her theory of 
relief from the terms of the Plan (which did not provide for 
those benefits), to her current argument that Employer 
Contributions and Plan Forfeitures should be granted to her as 
equitable relief for the Plan administrator's fiduciary breach 
caused by Raad's alleged misrepresentation of her benefits.  The 
court concluded that DeWitt had failed to plead a breach of 
fiduciary duty in her complaint and, in any event, had failed to 
allege facts sufficient to establish an actionable claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty and therefore denied DeWitt's motion for 
summary judgment for Employer Contributions and Plan Forfeitures 
on the fiduciary breach theory. 
 
 As an additional ground for recovery of the previously-
denied Employer Contributions and Plan Forfeitures, DeWitt also 
argued that the Plan was administered in an arbitrary and 
capricious fashion due to the disparity in treatment between her 
and the other employee, Byrne.  The court concluded that the 
differential treatment of Byrne and DeWitt did not amount to an 
arbitrary and capricious administration of the Plan because Byrne 
and DeWitt were not similarly situated as presented to the Plan 
Administrator for the purpose of distribution of benefits.  See 
912 F. Supp. at 722.  We will not disturb these rulings on 
appeal. 
 
 Finally, in her motion DeWitt sought reconsideration of 
the court's ruling that DeWitt's section 510 claims for Employer 
Contributions and Plan Forfeitures were time barred.  The 
district court found untimely her request that it reconsider its 
ruling in DeWitt I that DeWitt's claims for Employer 
Contributions and Plan Forfeitures were time-barred because 
DeWitt's motion for reconsideration was not filed within ten days 
of the entry of judgment. 
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Order.  On February 15, 1996, the court denied this motion.  This 
appeal followed.4  
 Dewitt raises numerous issues on appeal, many of which 
we find to be without merit.5  Two principal issues remain which 
we address. 
  
 II. 
 ERISA was "designed to promote the interests of 
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."  
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).  As we have 
observed on many occasions, ERISA's concern is with the 
administration of benefit plans and not with the precise design 
of the plans themselves.  Indeed, in enacting ERISA, Congress did 
not impose a duty on employers to provide health care or other 
                     
4.   The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When reviewing grants of summary 
judgment our scope of review is plenary.  We apply the same test 
the district court should have applied initially.  Goodman v. 
Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  The proper interpretation of the 
Plan at issue is a question of law.  Ulmer v. Harsco Corp., 884 
F.2d 98, 101-102 (3d Cir. 1989).   
5.   On appeal to us DeWitt asserts, inter alia, that she is 
entitled to receive the Employer Contributions and Plan 
Forfeitures applicable to her 1990 account balance as equitable 
restitution based upon the Plan Administrator's fiduciary breach 
and because such benefits were provided to the account of another 
employee, Byrne.  She also challenges the district court's 
decision that her section 510 claims for these same benefits were 
time-barred.  Lastly, she contends that the district court abused 
its discretion by denying Dewitt's motion to compel discovery 
responses because Dewitt failed to comply with the requirements 
of Rule 7.1.1 of the Local Rules of the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware.  We have reviewed each of 
these allegations and find that they are without merit.   
  
 
 10 
benefits to their employees.  In Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
we observed that "ERISA is not a direction to employers as to 
what benefits to grant their employees.  Rather, ERISA is 
concerned with the administration of an established plan and its 
elements."  863 F.2d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 1988).  See also Nazay v. 
Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1329 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The clear emphasis 
of the statute is to ensure the proper execution of plans once 
established."). 
 Pursuant to ERISA, a plan administrator must act "in 
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan 
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent" with 
ERISA's statutory requirements.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D), ERISA 
§ 504 (a)(2)(D).6  Accordingly, ERISA plans are required to be in 
writing.  29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).  They are to be administered by 
fiduciaries who are obligated to comply with the terms of the 
plan.  Nazay, 949 F.2d at 1329.   
 The award of benefits under any ERISA plan is governed 
in the first instance by the language of the plan itself.  A plan 
administrator may have discretion when interpreting the terms of 
                     
6.   This provision provides: 
 
(1)  Subject to sections 1103 (c) and  (d), 1342, and 1344 of 
this title, a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries and --  
 
 *  *  * 
 
(D)  in accordance with the documents and instruments governing 
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments 
are consistent with the provisions of this 
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter. 
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the plan; however, the interpretation may not controvert the 
plain language of the document.  Gaines v. Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 
753 F.2d 288, 289 (3d Cir. 1985).  We must uphold a plan 
interpretation even if we disagree with it, so long as the 
administrator's interpretation is rationally related to a valid 
plan purpose and is not contrary to the plain language of the 
plan.  Id. at 288.  Dewitt argues that the Plan Administrator's 
denial of additional benefits controverts the plain language of 
the Plan.   
 Although we exercise plenary review over the court's 
grant of summary judgment, our authority to review a plan 
administrator's decision to deny benefits is significantly more 
limited.  In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 
110-12 (1989), the Supreme Court held that where an ERISA-
governed benefits plan grants discretionary authority to the plan 
administrator to determine eligibility for benefits under the 
plan, a court reviewing the plan administrator's actions should 
apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.  Thus, a 
fiduciary's interpretation of a plan will not be disturbed if 
reasonable.  Id. at 111; Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 
1249 (3d Cir. 1993).  The Plan in this case contains a clause 
granting discretion to the Plan Administrator, see Plan ¶ 
12.01(d);7 thus only if the Plan Administrator's decision to deny 
                     
7.   Paragraph 12.01(d) provides: 
 
(d)  Powers of the Committee.  The Committee is specifically 
authorized and empowered, but not by way of limitation, 
 
(1)To construe or interpret the provisions of the Plan whenever 
necessary to carry out its intention and purpose. 
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Trust Income to Dewitt was arbitrary and capricious can we 
overturn his decision.   
 Under the terms of Dewitt's Plan, entitlement to Trust 
Income is contingent upon the existence of a viable account as of 
the Valuation Date.  Plan ¶ 6.02(e).  Here, Dewitt did not have 
an account on the Valuation Date because her act of requesting 
distribution of her account balance, and the processing of that 
request on December 28, 1996, had the effect of closing out her 
account.  Dewitt contends that under Paragraph 8.01, the Plan 
Administrator was forbidden from paying out the account proceeds 
until January 1, 1991.  Paragraph 8.01, entitled "Distribution of 
Benefit," provides for the timing of distribution of account 
proceeds as follows: 
8.01  Distribution of Benefit.  Any Benefit of a 
Participant that becomes payable under 
Article 7 shall be paid in the form of a 
single lump-sum cash distribution.  
Distribution shall be made under this section 
8.01 as soon as practicable after the end of 
the calendar month in which termination of 
employment occurs . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
(..continued) 
 
(2)To engage or employ such accountants, legal counsel, other 
advisors, agents and such clerical, medical and 
other services as may be required by Applicable 
Law or as it may deem advisable to assist in the 
administration of the Plan. 
 
(3)To establish from time to time rules for the administration of 
the Plan and the transaction of its business.  The 
determination of the Committee as to any disputed 
question arising hereunder including, but without 
limitation, questions of construction, 
administration and interpretation shall be final 
and conclusive upon all persons including, but not 
by way of limitation, Employees, Participants and 
Beneficiaries; their heirs, distributees and 
personal representatives; and any other person 
claiming an interest under the Plan.  
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 The Plan Administrator argues that Paragraph 8.01's 
mandatory language is reasonably construed to be directed at 
protecting the Plan participant from "unreasonable delay" in 
receipt of benefits.  He relies on Paragraph 8.03 of the Plan 
which directs the Trustee to make distributions "as soon as is 
reasonably practicable" after receiving notice of the 
distribution from the Plan committee.  This provision of the Plan 
provides: 
 8.03 Notice to Trustee. 
 
The Committee shall notify the Trustee whenever any 
Participant or Beneficiary is entitled to 
receive a distribution under the Plan . . . 
upon receipt of such notice from the 
Committee, the Trustee will, as soon as is 
reasonably practicable, distribute such 
amount . . . .  (Emphasis added). 
 
The Plan Administrator argues that it was "reasonably 
practicable" to make a distribution to Dewitt on December 28 and 
that she could not complain because she received her distribution 
earlier than she had expected or hoped.  The Plan Administrator 
argues that Dewitt failed to state a claim because she "requested 
and received a distribution of her benefits prior to the last 
business day of December," thereby forfeiting any interest in the 
1990 Trust Income otherwise allocable to her account. 
 The district court agreed with this interpretation that 
Paragraph 8.01 prevented the Plan from taking too long to pay out 
benefits but contained no prohibition on paying early.  The court 
held, "It is not unreasonable to interpret Paragraph 8.01 as 
setting the `subsequent month' rule for payment merely as a 
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mechanism to ensure prompt payment and avoid unreasonable delay 
which may adversely effect the Plan participant."  912 F. Supp. 
at 719.  The court found that this interpretation was not 
arbitrary and capricious, but rather, was grounded in the letter 
and spirit of the provision.  We disagree. 
 Even under our deferential standard of review, we 
conclude that the Plan Administrator's interpretation of these 
Plan provisions is unreasonable, because it disregards the 
language of the Plan which expressly provides that "Distribution 
shall be made . . . as soon as practicable after the end of the 
calendar month in which termination of employment occurs. . . ." 
 Plan, ¶8.01.  A Plan participant reading this provision could 
believe that it clearly prohibited distribution of an account 
prior to the end of the calendar month in which the employee was 
terminated.  Dewitt was thus entitled to the Trust Income from 
her account because the Plan Administrator acted in violation of 
this Plan provision which prohibits the Plan Administrator from 
making a final distribution prior to January 1, 1991, the month 
following the calendar month in which Dewitt's termination of 
employment occurred. 
 Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of law that the 
Plan Administrator's interpretation of the Plan was inconsistent 
with the plain language of the Plan and, therefore, there was no 
reasonable basis for the Plan Administrator's denial of benefits. 
We will reverse the judgment in favor of Penn-Del on Dewitt's 
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claim for Trust Income and direct that summary judgment be 
entered in favor of Dewitt on this claim.8 
 
 III. 
 Section 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, provides: 
§ 1140.  Interference with protected rights 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate 
against a participant or beneficiary for 
exercising any right to which he is entitled 
under the provisions of an employee benefit 
plan. . . for the purpose of interfering with 
the attainment of any right to which such 
participant may become entitled under the 
plan. . . . 
 
Congress enacted section 510 primarily to prevent "unscrupulous 
employers from discharging or harassing their employees in order 
to keep them from obtaining vested pension benefits."  Haberern 
v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd., 24 F.3d 1491, 1501 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted).   
 In Count II of her complaint, Dewitt alleges that 
"[t]he Company and Raad . . . discharged her from her employment 
                     
8.   In her appeal DeWitt also argued that she was entitled 
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to the Trust Income for the 1990 Plan 
year based upon the Plan Administrator's fiduciary breach in 
expediting payment in violation of the Plan's terms and an IRS 
Notice Regulation requiring 30 to 90 notice days prior to 
distribution.  DeWitt asserts that the Plan Administrator 
committed a fiduciary breach by "rushing payment in order to 
remove [her] account from the books of the plan before the end of 
the year."  DeWitt contends she is also entitled to restitution 
as an equitable remedy because of the misleading statement made 
by Raad.  Because we conclude that DeWitt is entitled to Trust 
Income under the terms of her Plan, we do not reach the merits of 
her claim that she is entitled to this same Trust Income based on 
the theory of fiduciary breach.  See Hein v. Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp., 88 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1996).   
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on a pretextual basis on December 12, 1990, with specific intent 
to deny her status as a participant in the Plan prior to the end 
of the calendar year and thereby specifically intended to deny 
and interfere with the accrual of additional accrued benefit 
amounts due her account, in violation of ERISA section 510, 29 
U.S.C. § 1140."  Complaint ¶24. 
 To establish a prima facie case under section 510 of 
ERISA, Dewitt must demonstrate: 
 1.  prohibited employer conduct; 
 2.  taken for the purpose of interfering; 
3. with the attainment of any right to which the employee may 
become entitled.  
 
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987), 29 U.S.C. § 1140.  If Dewitt 
succeeds in establishing each of these elements, a rebuttable 
presumption is created that section 510 has been violated.  
Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 853. 
 Interpreting section 510 of ERISA in Gavalik, we held 
that in order to recover under section 510, a plaintiff need not 
prove that "the sole reason for his [or her] termination was to 
interfere with pension rights."  Nonetheless, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant had the "specific intent" to 
violate ERISA.  812 F.2d at 851.  Proof of incidental loss of 
benefits as a result of a termination will not constitute a 
violation of section 510.  Id.  (Citing Titsch v. Reliance Group, 
Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1441 
(2d Cir. 1983) ("No ERISA cause of action [under § 510] lies 
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where the loss of . . . benefits [i]s a mere consequence of, but 
not a motivating factor behind, a termination of employment.")). 
 Consequently, to recover under section 510, the 
employee must show that the employer made a conscious decision to 
interfere with the employee's attainment of pension eligibility 
or additional benefits.  Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 860.  We have 
recognized that in most cases, however, "smoking gun" evidence of 
specific intent to discriminate does not exist.  As a result, the 
evidentiary burden in these cases may also be satisfied by the 
introduction of circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 851 (citing 
Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 791 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986)).   Dewitt asserts that she 
has indeed established such a circumstantial case "by combining 
the factors of her termination, expedited distribution as 
compared with the plain terms of the Plan, the comparable 
situation of Steven Byrne, and the misleading statements made by 
Raad."  We address each factor alone and in combination. 
 We begin our analysis with Dewitt's proffer of her 
termination on December 12, two weeks prior to the Valuation 
Date.9  In Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., we observed that 
"where the only evidence that an employer specifically intended 
to violate ERISA is the employee's lost opportunity to accrue 
additional benefits, the employee has not put forth evidence 
sufficient to separate that intent from the myriad of other 
                     
9.   DeWitt acknowledges that the mere fact that she was 
terminated near the end of the year, standing alone, would be 
insufficient to support a section 510 claim.   
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possible reasons for which an employer might have discharged 
him."  Turner, 901 F.2d 335, 347 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Clark v. 
Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 771 (5th Cir. 1988)).  This kind 
of deprivation occurs every time an ERISA employer discharges an 
employee and is not alone probative of an intent to interfere 
with pension rights.  Accordingly, a prima facie case requires 
additional evidence suggesting that pension interference was a 
motivating factor. 
 With respect to the expedited distribution of benefits, 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that the prompt payment 
of Dewitt's benefits by the Plan Administrator was made in order 
to avoid paying her amounts which would be due on December 31, 
1990, and that this was done by the Plan Administrator to achieve 
some benefit for the employer.  We observe as we did in Turner, 
supra, that "the record contains no evidence that the savings to 
the employer resulting from [the plaintiff's] termination were of 
sufficient size that they may be realistically viewed as a 
motivating factor."  See Turner, 901 F.2d at 347.10  Here, too, 
the savings to Penn-Del and its Plan were not sufficiently 
significant to be a motivating factor.   
                     
10.   Indeed, the expedited distribution of DeWitt's account 
balance did not result in any additional savings to her employer 
or to the Plan in terms of DeWitt's entitlement to the Employer 
Contributions and Plan Forfeitures allocable to her account.  Due 
to the fact that DeWitt was terminated on December 12, 1990, 
under the terms of her Plan, she was no longer eligible to 
receive these benefits in any event.  Plan ¶¶5.01, 5.02 and 
6.02(c)-(d). 
 
 With respect to the Trust Income allocable to her 
account, the distribution of DeWitt's account prior to January 1, 
1991, resulted in a savings of approximately $1,400-$2,200. 
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 Likewise, we are not persuaded that Raad's alleged  
misrepresentation regarding the timing for distribution of 
benefits gives rise to an inference of specific intent to 
interfere with Dewitt's benefits.  Significantly, Raad's alleged 
statements could not have affected Dewitt's receipt of Employer 
Contributions or Plan Forfeitures which, under the terms of the 
Plan, are available only to those employed on the Plan's 
Valuation Date.  Plan ¶¶5.01, 5.02.  As well, as we pointed out 
above, these statements could not affect Dewitt's entitlement to 
the Trust Income allocable to her account pursuant to Paragraph 
8.01 of her Plan.   
 Lastly, we agree with the district court that the 
manner in which Byrne's benefits were handled by the Plan 
Administrator are not relevant.  Even assuming that the Plans for 
Dewitt and Byrne were identical, and the record does not inform 
us one way or the other, Dewitt's employer had elected to make 
Byrne's termination effective on January 3, 1989, but fired 
Dewitt on December 12, 1990.  Because Dewitt was an at-will 
employee, her employer could terminate her employment, for any 
reason and on any date the employer chose.  Thus, "[e]ach former 
employee's respective position relative to the Valuation Date 
renders the differential treatment of their benefits proper."  
See 912 F. Supp. at 720. 
 Because we agree with the district court that all of 
these facts, taken together, do not constitute sufficient 
evidence of an intent to interfere with benefits, we will affirm 
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the court's grant of summary judgment in Penn-Del's favor on this 
claim. 
 
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the district 
court's entry of summary judgment against DeWitt on the claim for 
Trust Income pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA.  We will 
affirm the judgment of the district court on DeWitt's section 510 
claim and in all other respects. 
 
CAROL DEWITT, APPELLANT V. PENN-DEL DIRECTORY CORPORATION, A 
FOREIGN CORPORATION; NATIONAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY CORPORATION 
PROFIT SHARING PLAN; NATIONAL TELEPHONE DIRECTOR CORPORATION PLAN 
ADMINISTRATOR OF PROFIT SHARING PLAN, NO. 96-7163 
 
BECKER, CIRCUIT JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART: 
 Although I join in parts I and III of the majority's 
opinion, I cannot agree with the conclusion that the majority 
reaches in part II as to the proper interpretation of the ERISA 
plan at issue.  Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the 
plan administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 
interpreting the plan to allow the distribution of benefits in 
the same month in which the termination of employment occurs. 
 I. 
 The relevant provisions of the ERISA plan at issue are 
Paragraphs 8.01 and 8.03, both of which are excerpted in the 
majority opinion.  The plain language of the two paragraphs does 
  
 
 21 
not, as the majority contends, lead ineluctably to a single 
interpretation.  Rather, when read together, the two paragraphs 
are ambiguous.  On the one hand, Paragraph 8.01 requires that 
distribution of benefits be made "as soon as practicable after 
the end of the calendar month in which . . . termination of 
employment occurs . . . ."  On the other hand, Paragraph 8.03 
requires that, when he is notified that a beneficiary is due 
benefits, the Trustee of the plan will distribute the benefits 
"as soon as is reasonably practicable."  Paragraph 8.03 goes no 
further in describing when the distribution is to be made. 
 Therefore, assuming that a beneficiary is entitled to a 
distribution, there is the possibility of conflicting demands on 
the Trustee.  If, as was the case here, it was reasonably 
practicable for the Trustee to distribute the benefits before the 
end of the calendar month in which the termination occurred, is 
the Trustee to wait for the month to end, as Paragraph 8.01 
suggests, or, is the Trustee to distribute the benefits when they 
are ready, as Paragraph 8.03 suggests? 
 In my view, given the ambiguity inherent in Paragraphs 
8.01 and 8.03, the plan administrator did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in interpreting the plan to mean that distribution 
of benefits would occur in this case as soon as reasonably 
practicable.  Certainly, the language itself allows for this as 
one possible reading of the plan.  This is especially so because 
it is sound policy and makes good sense to encourage plan 
administrators to distribute benefits due beneficiaries sooner 
rather than later.  More often than not, beneficiaries need their 
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benefits immediately; delaying distribution might be highly 
detrimental.11  Requiring the plan administrator to wait to 
distribute the benefits until the end of the calendar month in 
which the termination of employment occurs would inject 
unnecessary delay into a process that should function 
expeditiously. 
 In sum, I cannot fault the plan administrator for 
expediting the distribution of DeWitt's benefits in this case.12 
 I would therefore affirm the judgment of the district court in 
all respects. 
                     
     
11Although she did not communicate her need to her employer, 
DeWitt's own situation provides an example.  DeWitt stated in her 
deposition that she needed her distribution almost immediately.  
She did not know how long she would be out of a job, and she 
wanted to help her son, who had just entered college, with his 
tuition. 
     
12I am troubled by Raad's failure to inform DeWitt that if 
she were to wait until after the Valuation Date to fill out a 
request for a distribution of her benefits she would be ensured 
of receiving a greater distribution.  However, as the majority 
notes supra in footnotes 3 and 5, DeWitt failed to allege facts 
sufficient to show that Raad stood in a fiduciary relationship to 
her.  Moreover, even assuming such a fiduciary relationship, Raad 
did not have a duty to inform DeWitt that waiting to request a 
distribution might be beneficial; DeWitt did not allege that she 
made known to Raad any facts that would create such a duty.  See 
In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 
F.3d 1255, 1261-67 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing the scope of the 
affirmative fiduciary duty to provide ERISA beneficiaries with 
information about the ERISA plan); Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1301-03 (3d Cir. 
1993) (same). 
